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  This research aims to further the understanding of price behavior in predominantly 
agricultural water markets through a hedonic estimation of the impact of market and product 
attributes on water rights prices in the Cachapoal River Valley of South-Central Chile.  It is 
hypothesized that the price of a water right in the valley is primarily a function of the 
reliability of that water right (product attribute) and the increasing relative scarcity of water in 
the valley (market attribute).  This article aims to test the joint hypotheses that reliability and 
relatively scarcity positively affect water rights prices.  In addition, it will estimate the 
magnitude of these product and market attributes on market prices.   1 
Water Rights Heterogeneity and Price Determination:   
How Market and Product Attributes Affect Agricultural Water Market Prices 
 
Introduction 
  Since the early 1980s, there has been a surging interest in the use of private markets in 
the allocation of scarce water resources.   Early work focused on  debating the advantages and 
disadvantages of moving to markets in tradable water rights (Rosegrant and Binswanger 
1994; Griffin and Hsu 1993;  Colby Saliba and Bush 1987;  Howe and Shaw, 1990, Anderson 
1983) and simulations of potential water market outcomes (Weinberg et. al 1993; Dinar and 
Lety 1991, Howe et. al. 1990; Vaux and Howitt 1984.   
  In theory, a water market allows the most efficient allocation of resources as those 
users who value water most highly bid away resources from lower-valued uses.  In 
equilibrium, the value of the marginal product of water is equalized within trading areas and 
there exists a single market price.  This presumes, however, that water rights are 
homogeneous goods.  Those who view water rights in this light claim that price dispersion is 
a sign of thin markets.  Other authors point out, however, that price dispersion is rather a 
reflection of the heterogeneity of water rights as commodities and the particular 
characteristics of each market (Colby et al, 1993, Bjornlund and McKay, 1998).  Since water 
rights are not homogeneous goods, their attributes, as well as the unique characteristics of the 
market in which they are transacted, will affect the prices paid for them. 
  This research aims to further the understanding of price behavior in predominantly 
agricultural water markets through a hedonic estimation of the impact of market and product 
attributes on water rights prices in the Cachapoal River Valley of South-Central Chile.  It is 
hypothesized that the price of a water right in the valley is primarily a function of the 
reliability of that water right (product attribute) and the increasing relative scarcity of water in 
the valley (market attribute).  This article aims to test the joint hypotheses that reliability and   2 
relatively scarcity positively affect water rights prices.  In addition, it will estimate the 
magnitude of these product and market attributes on market prices. 
 
Literature Review 
  There have been few studies of price behavior in water markets.  Where established 
water markets do exist, it is often difficult to obtain reliable price and transactions 
information.  Gardner and Miller (1983) provide the first analysis of water market prices in 
the Colorado Big Thompson water market.  They find that between 1961 and 1972, real water 
rights prices increased thirty-fold, an increase that far outpaced agricultural returns during the 
same period.  They attribute this increase to the speculation value of irrigation water rights in 
more highly valued alternative municipal and industrial uses.  Dourojeanni and Jouravlev 
(1999), examining the water market in Chile, indicate that water rights prices show sustained 
increases over time.  They attribute this phenomena to the increasing relative scarcity of 
water, but they provide no empirical analysis to substantiate  their claims.  Colby et. al (1987) 
focus on potential differences between market prices and the marginal social value of water.  
They submit that most water markets deviate from the competitive model, suggesting that 
prices are but a rough approximation of the social value of additional water supplies. 
  None of the above studies relates the characteristics of different water rights to their 
prices.  The hedonic estimation technique is particularly useful for such a study.    Hedonic 
studies have been used to analyze the effects that different characteristics of a good have on 
its price.  Once marginal characteristics prices have been estimated, they can then be used to 
analyze the underlying demands for the different characteristics of a good.  Hedonic methods 
are based on the realization that some goods or factors of production are not homogeneous 
goods and can differ in numerous characteristics.  A water right is a clear example of a 
heterogeneous  good.  They differ in quality, quantity and variability and their productivity is   3 
often linked to their location.  Crouter (1987) was the first to apply hedonic estimation to 
water markets in which water and land are transacted together to the implicit price of water in 
the transaction.   Colby et. al (1993) and Bjornlund and McKay (1998) followed with hedonic 
estimation of water rights prices in markets where water was sold separately from land.   Both 
studies found that water values have increased over time and that certain buyers in the market 
pay a premium for water rights prices.  They also demonstrated that there exists a discount in 
the unit price for large purchases of water (or correspondingly a premium for small 
purchases).  The similarity of these studies´ conclusions is striking given that they were each 
carried out in very different river basins in different time periods  Colby et. al examine water 
rights transactions in the Gila San Francisco basin of New Mexico from 1971 to 1987 
whereas Bjornlund and McKay study a rural water market in South Australia during the 
period 1987-1993.  Further hedonic studies of water markets, therefore, may enable 
researchers to identify trends and characteristics common to all markets.  This article aims to 
contribute in this vein by providing a hedonic estimation of water rights prices in the 
Cachapoal River Valley of Chile from 1990-1999. 
  The remainder of this article is organized as follows.  First background information on 
Chilean water legislation since the inception of the water market is present along with a 
description of the Cachapoal river valley.  This is followed by an exposition of the conceptual 
framework used in the analysis, a description of the data and summary statistics and formal 
presentation of the hedonic price model.   Concluding remarks follow and analysis and 
discussion of the results. 
 
Background on Chilean Water Legislation 
  The first free-standing water legislation in Chile was promulgated with the 1951 Water 
Code, which granted private property status to usufructory rights over water resources while   4 
maintaining the state ownership of the physical water resources..  Water rights were granted 
as concessions in which the grantee was required to specify the use to which the water would 
be put as well as demonstrate that there existed adequate distribution infrastructure to capture 
and deliver the water right.  In addition, water rights that were not exercise for a period of five 
years could be expropriated by the State.  Since use rights were private property, they could 
be traded, rented or mortgaged.  This was the beginning of the water market in Chile.   
  In 1967, the agricultural sector in Chile underwent a radical transformation as the State 
expropriated large estates, which they later divided into smaller parcels and redistributed to a 
new class of small landowners created by the Agrarian Reform.  Together with land, water 
use rights were also expropriated and state control of these rights was strengthened.  Water 
rights lost their designation as private property and could no longer be traded.  This water 
market moratorium lasted until 1981 with the appearance of the current Water Code.   
  The 1981 Water Code is in many ways a return to the 1951 Code.  Private property 
rights have been re-established and trading is allowed.  In addition, the beneficial use clause, 
which gave the State the power to expropriate water rights that had not been used for a period 
of five years, has been  eliminated.  Users are no longer required to specify the use to which 
they intended to put the water rights solicited from the State, nor are they obligated to 
demonstrate that they possess infrastructure capable of capturing and delivering such water 
rights.  As a result, the 1981 Water Code opened up a window of opportunity for speculation 
in water rights that did not previously exist..  This possibility of speculation has led many 
researchers to believe that water rights prices have been steadily increasing over time since 
1981. 
   5 
Description of Study Area 
  The Cachapoal River Valley is located in the sixth region of Chile, just south of the 
Santiago Metropolitan Area.  The region is characterized by high value export crops and is 
home to several multinational agricultural export firms, due to its expedited access to the 
country’s two major ports: San Antonio and Valparaíso.   In land area, it is superseded only 
by Santiago, covering over one and a half million hectares.  Agricultural activity accounts for 
26 percent of the regional economy and is concentrated in the production of export fruit, 
livestock, vegetable crops and cereals.  The region produces 45 percent of  apple production, 
25 percent of table grape production , 55 percent of corn production and 43 percent of 
livestock production at the national level ( Pastures account for 56 percent of land use.). 
  The Cachapoal River valley covers 44 percent of the land area within the region (See 
Map).  It has its source at the foot of the Pico del Borroso summit, 5,160 feet above sea level, 
and it cuts through the Cachapoal river valley, flowing 164 kilometers to the Pacific Ocean.  
The river basin extends over 7,155 square kilometers and is characterized by a Mediterranean 
climate where the greatest river flows are produced during the winter months and the 
snowmelt period between spring and summer.  River flows peak in June-July and December. 
  The Cachapoal river covers the Cachapoal province almost in its entirety.  Of a total of 
17 communes within the province, only four receive water from other sources.  The river is 
divided into three administrative sections of which the first is the largest, covering 73.4 
percent of the river valley’s land area.  This section extends to Punto de Cortés, just above the 
confluence of the Estero La Cadena with the Cachapoal river, where the second section of the 
river begins.  This section is much smaller in importance, covering less than 10 percent of the 
land area of the river valley and extending to the confluence of the Estero Purén with the 
Cachapoal River.  This section differs significantly from the other two in that it is supplied 
principally by return flows and infiltrations from the first section.  As a result, there is very   6 
little water market activity in this zone.  The final section of the river extends to the end of the 
Cachapoal River at its confluence with the Tinguirririca River.  Tables 1 and 2 provide 
information on irrigation technology and land use along the river by section. 
 
Figure 1:  Map of Cachapoal River Valley, Sixth Region, Chile 
 
 
Table No. 1:  :  Infrastructure and Number of Irrigators by Section:  Cachapoal River 
  Section 1  Section 2  Section 3  River 
Diversion  Points  12  13 8 33 
Canals  31 19 11 61 
Irrigators  10.272 4.147  4.888 19.307 
Source:  Agricultural Census Data, 1997 
Table No.2: Land Use and Irrigation Systems in the Cachapoal River 
  Land Use 
Percent of Arable Land Area 
Irrigated Systems 
Percent of Arable Land Area 
  Ag and 
Livestock 
Forestry Furrow  Sprinkler  Drip 
Section 1  63.1  36.7  93.4  2,1  4,5 
Section 2  66.8  33.2  98.4  0,6  1,0 
Section 3  90.1  9.9  91.4  1,7  6,9 
Source:  Agricultural Census Data, 1997   7 
 
Methodology and Data 
Conceptual Framework 
   A water right is a heterogeneous good as rights located in different sectors vary in 
productivity, variability and mean flows.  We may refer to this characteristic of water rights 
as spatial heterogeneity, the amount that a water right differs based on its geographic location.  
Variability of water flows may manifest itself between seasons as the hydrological cycle 
moves from wetter to drier years, within seasons, depending on the timing and availability of 
flows during growing season.  It may also, however, manifest itself based on the distribution 
infrastructure and location of the water right along the river.  It is this type of spatial 
variability that is the focus of the present analysis.  Those water rights located upstream, for 
example, will generally by the most reliable with the greatest mean flows.  As one moves 
downstream, however, return flows and conduction losses begin to become more important.  
These factors will always, increase the variability of water flows to downstream users, either 
positively or negatively.  As more users enter the system and begin to remove and return 
water flows, the flows to downstream farmers will become more variable.  This phenomena 
will present itself both within and across growing seasons.  Reductions in water supply over 
time are often positively correlated with conduction losses along a river, in many cases 
leaving those users at the end of the river without water, or with a  water supply so unreliable, 
that agricultural production becomes impossible. 
  In addition to geographical factors, the infrastructure used to capture and deliver water 
to rights holders may influence the water flow variability.  In the Cachapoal River Valley 
water is delivered by either permanent concrete structures or by rustic temporary structures.  .  
Permanent structures are more reliable than temporary structures because temporary structure 
require constant supervision to ensure that water is distributed accurately and on time.     8 
Temporary structures must also be periodically replaced, potentially disrupting or distorting 
flows to users over time.  The type of structure used to deliver water rights is often a function 
of the organization and efficiency of water user associations as well, where larger more 
organized associations have installed permanent structures and the more fragmented groups of 
users rely on temporary structures.  In this sense, irrigation district efficiency indirectly 
increases the reliability of water right flows. 
  Thus the variability of water flows may be positively affected by both their spatial 
heterogeneity and by the efficiency of the irrigation district to which they are assigned.  To 
capture the effects of these factors, two sets of binary variables are included in the model.  
The first set of variables identify the location of the water right by section, where the first 
section is that located the farthest upstream and the third section is that located at the tail end 
of the river.  The second section is used as the benchmark.  The second binary variable 
identifies the type of infrastructure used to capture and deliver the water right, where a value 
of one is used to identify temporary structures.  These structures are identified with inefficient 
irrigation districts. 
  Other factors which may affect the price of a water right may be related more to the 
market than to the actual product.  There have been no studies done of  water market 
structures, apart from a few studies on the thinness of water markets in general.  However, it 
is completely possible to observe in water markets, behaviors typical of other markets such as 
price discrimination in the form of quantity discounts.  To capture the possibility of quantity 
discounts, the quantity of water rights transferred per transaction is regressed against the unit 
price of the transaction.   A negative sign for the coefficient of this variable would imply a 
volume discount whereas a positive sign would imply a premium or increasing unit price for 
large purchases.  This latter phenomena may be completely plausible if we assume that   9 
farmers attach an increasing marginal value to their stock of water rights as that stock 
diminishes.  
  Finally, we may expect agents in the water market to have differing reservation prices 
for water rights.   It is expected that well-known firms or farmers identified as important 
forces in the regional agricultural economy may value water rights more highly than smaller 
and less known buyers.  Transactions costs for these farmers may also be lower as they may 
possess more market information and better skills in the area of negotiation, contracting and 
subsequent protection of the integrity of the water rights they purchase.  Lower costs 
combined with higher reliability of water right delivery may imply that these actors would be 
willing to pay more per unit of water than other buyers.  The existence of such buyers was 
first postulated by Colby et al (1993) which found that buyers such as city governments, 
public utilities or dominant actors in the regional economy tend to pay higher prices  for water 
rights to avoid negative public perceptions of price gouging behavior.   
  Finally, it is generally believed that water rights prices are increasing over time.  This 
is due to the increasing demand for water over time in the fact of fixed supplies of both water 
rights and water volumes, translating into an increasing relative scarcity of water over time.  
This increasing relative scarcity is expected to generate an increase in the value of water 
rights over time (Donoso, 1995). 
 
Data 
  Data on permanent water rights transactions from 1990 to 1999 in the Cachapoal 
River Valley were collected from local Real Estate and Judicial Archives offices and 
compared with the original purchase agreements to verify sales prices and transaction dates.  
Only water rights sold without land are included in the analysis for a total of 126 transactions.    10 
Tables 3 and 4 provide some descriptive statistics of the data for all canals and for the top four 
canals in terms of transactions. 
Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics, All Transactions 
Variable  No.  Obs.  Mean Max  Min Mode  Std.  Dev 
Quantity 
(partes del río) 
 0.459  7.583  0.002  1.0 0.848 
Price (CH$)    82,275,780  604,198,877  68,472  352,072,689  156,659,902 
Section1 101           
Section2 6           
Section3 19          
High Profile  28           
Perm Infr.  101           
            
TOTAL 
TRANS 
126          
 
 
Table 4:  Descriptive Statistics, Top Four Canals in terms of Transactions 
Variable Lucano  Cocalán  Peterson  Punto  de  Cortés  percent 
of Total 
· #Trans  29 18 19 11  61 
Quantity (Partes 
del Río) 
      
     Mean  0.215  1.057  0.418  0173   
     Std. Dev  0.475 1.917 0.419 0.229   
     Max  2.469  7.583  1.712  0.83   
     Min   0.006  0.032  0.077  0.003   
Unit Price (CH$)        
     Mean  247,111,514  2,476,989  14,777,354  127,166,216   
     Std. Dev  206,470,017 2,027,770 7,744,977  232,943,510   
     Max  526,781,459  8,710,544  29,532,684  604,198,877   
     Min   267,350  333,821  1,968,249  8,960,906   
High  Profile  17 0 2 3  75 
Perm.  Infrast.  29 18 19 11  76 
Section  1 3 1 1   
 
  The 1981 Water Code in Chile requires that all water rights be defined in volumes per 
unit of time.  In practice, however, water rights may be defined in such diverse units as liters 
per second, cubic meters, percentages of the river, rights in the river, regadores and acciones.  
In the Cachapoal River Valley, all transactions collected were expressed in acciones.  These 
acciones, however, represent differing volumetric equivalents depending on the canal to 
which they are assigned.  In order to compare price differences between canals, therefore, all 
acciones was transformed into partes del río o river rights.  Each canal is assigned a certain   11 
quota of rights in the river.  This quota is divided into acciones and distributed among the 
members of the canal based on an internal division factor, which varies by canal.  Using this 
internal division factor, it is possible to retransform the acciones to river rights, which is 
standard measure for the entire valley.  Using this measure, and the transformed prices, we 
may proceed with the hedonic analysis for the entirety of the river valley. 
 
Functional Form and Econometric Model 
  Much has been written about the appropriate functional forms of hedonic price 
regressions.  Rosen (1974) was the first to postulate the nonlinearity of such equations due to 
the inseparability of the product attributes.  Empirically, however, the linear model is 
advantageous in its ease of computation and the transparency of the regression coefficients 
which represent the marginal willingness to pay for product attributes.  Finally, the 
appropriate functional form becomes an empirical question.  In this model, several functional 
forms were explored including the semi-log, double log, and Box-Cox transformations.   
Although a Box-Cox transformation of all the continuous variables yielded the best fit, a log 
linear model was chosen since it differed little in terms of fit compared with the Box-Cox and 
for the ease of interpretation of its coefficients as price flexibilities.  The regression equation 
estimated therefore is: 
 
ln ln ln PT C Q S I it it it it it it it =+ + + + + + β β β β β β ε 01 2 3 4 1 5      (1) 
 
where  P is the price of a river right, T is a time trend, and Q is the quantity of river rights 
transferred in the transaction.  The variable C identifies the high profile buyers and the 
variable S1  is a locational variable which identifies those transactions realized in the first   12 
section of the river.  Irrigation district efficiency and infrastructure reliability is represented 
by the variable I.  . 
 
Results and Discussion 
  Results from the econometric estimation are presented in Table 5  Of the five 
independent variables presented in the model, four are significant at the 1 percent level.  The 
adjusted R
2 is 0.7515, demonstrating that the variables included in the analysis explain to a 
large extent water rights prices in the valley. 
Table 5:  Coefficient Estimates of Hedonic Price Model 
Variable  Estimated Coefficient  Exponential of Coefficient  Std. Error  T-Statistics 
Quantity -0.4576  N/A  0.0833  -5.490 
Time 0.0445  N/A  0.1728  0.258 
Section 1  1.3634  3.91  0.2538  5.372 
Profile 2.5516  12.83  0.3008  8.482 
Tipocap -1.3804  0.25  0.2455  -5.622 
Constant 14.0990  N/A  0.3984  35.390 
 
Water Rights Variability 
  As stated in the conceptual framework, one important indicator of flow variability is 
the location of the water right along the river, where water rights located furthest upstream 
will be less variable, and therefore command higher prices, than those located further 
downstream.  ´The results of the regression support this hypothesis.  Water rights in the first 
section command prices 291 percent higher than those located further downstream in the 
second and third sections. 
The second variable included in the analysis to capture the effect of flow variability is 
the type of infrastructure used to capture and deliver the water right, which is highly 
correlated with the efficiency of the irrigation district that manages that right.  The results 
indicate that water rights managed by more efficient irrigation districts command prices 75 
percent higher than those managed by fragmented farmer groups.     13 
Price discrimination in the form of quantity discounts exist in the water market.  A ten 
percent increase in the quantity of river rights purchased results in a 4.6 percent discount in 
the unit price.  This discount is small but highly significant in the model. It is helpful to note 
that a 10 percent increase in river rights is equivalent to between an increase of x  to x number 
of water rights. 
  High profile buyers are shown to pay considerably more for water rights than 
their lesser known piers.  A high profile buyer on average pays approximately 10 times more 
in the unit price than other farmers in the market.  It should be pointed out, however, that 
these buyers tend to buy small quantities of water rights and therefore often do not take 
advantage of quantity discounts available in the market.  These buyers may also have much 
higher marginal products of water. 
Finally, there is no statistically significant relationship between the price of water 
rights and the time trend.  This implies that the price of water rights are not increasing over 
time despite the increasing relative scarcity of water.  This is a curious result but can be 
possibly explained by the existence of  cheaper substitutes for water rights to increase on-farm 
water supply.  These substitutes may include both improvements in irrigation efficiency, 
through the installation of  drip or other types of mechanized irrigation systems, or use of 
groundwater supplies.  Since the mid 1980s in Chile, the government has offered subsidies to 
farmers to install drip irrigation systems.  Such systems may be able to more than double a 
farmer’s on farm water supply, negating the need to purchase additional rights.  Groundwater 
pumping may also be more economical than purchasing water rights.  Finally, both 
alternatives may also provide more reliable flows than the acquisition of additional water 
rights.  
   14 
Conclusions 
  A water right that delivers a less variable flow is more highly valued in the market 
than one which delivers a more volatile flow.  This result can be seen in the reduction in the 
prices paid for water rights as one moves downstream and in the fact that water rights 
delivered by more secure infrastructure command higher prices than those delivered by less 
secure infrastructure.  We can also interpret this result as the value attributed to a water right 
according to its hydrological priority since those water rights located closer to the source of 
the river are the first to be fulfilled in the event of a drought.  As such, it is quite possible that 
during droughts, those water rights located in the tail end of the river may never be fulfilled.  
The existence of a hydrological priority affects the price of a water right, where one must pay 
a premium for water rights that are found closer to the source of the river. 
  Water rights prices do not respond to the increasing relative scarcity of water, an 
unexpected result.  If we accept that relative scarcity is increasing over time, we must 
conclude that there exist close substitutes to the purchase of new water rights in the zone.  The 
demand for water rights is not increasing because water resources are being freed up through 
improvements in irrigation efficiency, generating a more efficient use of the resource. 
  Discounts in unit prices are offered for large purchases of water rights in the market. 
These discounts are on the order of  4,6% for a 10% increased in water rights purchased.  
Parallel to this result, certain buyers in the water market will pay a premium in the unit price 
for water rights which is ten-fold that paid in the average transaction.  These buyers tend to 
important actors in the regional agricultural market and it is thought that they possess greater 
information and are able to extract higher marginal values in water use than other agents in 
the market.   15 
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